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I. Executive Summary: 
 Different types of regimes face different political situations and have different incentives 
to pursue different policies. In this paper, I am examining whether there are any differences in 
economic and social policy outcomes under democracy and dictatorship in Indonesia. The study 
is divided into two periods. The first period covers the authoritarian rule of President 
Suharto(1966 to 1998) and the second period covers the new democratic government(1999 to 
2010). I set out by analyzing the rules used in distinguishing democracy from dictatorship and 
discussing the process by which Suharto's regime was categorized as a dictatorship and the 
Indonesian government after 1999 as democratic. Then I compare and contrast the economic and 
social policies pursued under each of the two regime types and the policy outcomes achieved. 
Some authors suggest that democracy is more conducive to economic and human development 
than authoritarian leadership whereas others suggest that there is no significant difference. Some 
even suggest the authoritarian regime to be better at developing a country. In the case of 
Indonesia, I found that there is no significant change in the trend both in economic and human 
development and in some cases, the development rate is slower under democracy. I discuss the 
findings in light of literatures on democracy and development. Indonesia's democracy is still 
young and the democratic period covered by the study is relatively short compared to the 
authoritarian period. Better comparison of policy outcomes could be made in the future if further 
research can be done after Indonesia's democracy becomes stronger.  
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II. Introduction   
 
 We live in a world where there are different forms of government and political systems. 
These different types of government face different incentives and pursue different policies. There 
are many studies and literatures on how the democratic and authoritarian governments affect 
economic development and human development. There are arguments on each side claiming one 
is better than the other at developing the country. Some said that democracy has a negative effect 
on investment and undermines growth whereas dictatorship has an advantage in making tough 
choices to foster economic growth. On the contrary, some argue that democracy better 
guaranteed the individual property rights and free flow of information which are required for the 
development of economy. Some even said that there is no causal relationship between regime 
type and development. With respect to policies on human development, some argue that 
democratic governments spend more than dictatorships on the provision of public goods due to 
popular pressure and as a result, human development is higher under democratic governments. 
Some on the other side claimed that dictatorships overtake democratic regimes in social spending 
when the economic development reaches a high level because they lack legitimacy and use social 
spending as a crucial mean of building political support. Therefore, I find it interesting to 
compare and contrast the policy outcomes under different regime types and try to understand 
why certain policy outcomes are resulted in a certain context. Concerning the regime types and 
the policy outcomes, among the many countries that have been studied by many scholars, 
Indonesia became particularly interesting for me.  
 Indonesia is a country located off the coast of mainland Southeast Asia in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. It is an archipelago consisting of approximately 17,508 islands. According to the 
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World Bank, it has a population of 239.9 million in 2010. It has more than 300 distinct ethnic 
groups and is the world's fourth most populous nation. Indonesia is a resource-rich nation and it 
has been a member of OPEC1 until 2008 when it formally suspended its membership. Indonesia 
is an interesting country to study the policy outcomes under different regimes because it has been 
through different political systems and different economic conditions throughout history. 
According to Prezworski et al. (2000), Indonesia has been under civilian dictatorship from 1946 
to 1965, military dictatorship from 1966 to 1998 and democratic government from 1999 
onwards. The Indonesia's economy has also been through many ups and downs. Under the 
civilian dictatorship of President Sukarno, Indonesia has had poor economy but under President 
Suharto's military dictatorship, Indonesia has achieved strong economic growth till the economy 
collapsed after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. After the transition to democracy and 
subsequent economic reforms,  Indonesia's economy began to develop again. Indonesia has 
achieved a strong economic growth rate under the authoritarian regime although the economy 
finally collapsed. I find it interesting to see if the new government after the democratic transition 
performs better at developing the country under changing political conditions and how the policy 
outcomes are different under different regimes.  
 The study period in my paper covers Indonesia from 1966 to 2010. During that period 
Indonesia has been under President Suharto's New Order regime from 19662 to 1998 and the new 
democratic government from 1999 to 20103. Suharto became president of Indonesia in 1967 after 
                                                             
1 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
2 Although Suharto was named Acting President on March 12 1967 by the Indonesia's provisional Parliament and 
formally appointed as President on March 27 1968, the Supersemar decree of 11 March 1966 transferred much of 
the authority from the president to Suharto to take any measure he deemed necessary to restore order in 
Indonesia in 1966 . Therefore, Suharto's New Order regime was regarded to begin in 1966.   
3 When Suharto stepped down, B.J . Habibie who had served as vice-president under Suharto, took the presidency. 
B. J. Habibie's term in office was from 1998 to 1999.. He made some reforms but he came from Suharto's party and 
his government was only viewed as a transitional government and not as a new democratic government. 
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Sukarno4 had been stripped of presidential title by the People's Consultative Assembly of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Suharto declared his government as the New Order government and his 
ideology as Pancasila5 Democracy although it was regarded by scholars as authoritarian regime. 
There were elections6 throughout his rule in which he always won and he remained in presidency 
for 32 years till he was forced to resign in 1998. During Suharto's period, Indonesia developed 
economically and was regarded as one of the economic miracles of Asia (World Bank, 1993). 
However there was public dissent towards Suharto's regime especially due to the widespread 
corruption and political oppression.7 The Asian financial crisis in 19978 strongly hit Indonesia's 
economy and it led to protests nationwide. Finally Suharto agreed to step down from presidency 
and transferred the presidency to his vice-president B.J. Habibie in 1998. After the short rule of 
B.J. Habibie, democratic elections were held in 1999 and new democratic government came to 
power. Since, the two periods that I discuss in my paper have two different forms of government, 
the political transition in 1998-1999 provided me with the opportunity to study the different 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Therefore, the democratic period in Indonesia began after the election in 1999 and in my paper I will refer to 
President's Habibie's era which is from May 1998 to October 1999 as the democratic transition period.  
4 Sukarno was a revolutionary leader who struggled for Indonesia's independence  from the Netherlands and 
became the first president of Indonesia after Independence.  Sukarno remained in presidency from 1946 till 1966 
when he was replaced by General Suharto.  
5 Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of Indonesia. It was first officially introduced in Indonesia by the 
first president Sukarno. Pancasila is composed of two words, "panca" meaning five and "sila" meaning principles. 
Therefore, Pancasila Democracy is based on five principles; (1) belief in the one and only God (2) just and civilized 
humanity (3) the unity of Indonesia (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives and (5) social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.  
6 Elections were held during Suharto's presidency but he allowed the existence of only three parties including his 
own Golkar party. Suharto's New Order government asked nationalist and Christian parties to merge as the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and Muslim parties as the People's Development Party(PPP). The opposition 
parties were subject to government interference even in the choice of the parties' leadership and were prevented 
from operating at the local level other than during the three-week official campaign period prior to election.  
7 Please see (Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004) and (Niles, 2001) 
8 Asian financial crisis started in Thailand in 1997 with the collapse of Thai baht. Thai government decided to no 
longer peg the local currency to the U.S. dollar after defending the value of its currency using foreign reserves. 
Currency decline spread rapidly throughout South Asia, causing stock market declines, reduced import revenues 
and government upheaval. 
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policies pursued by two different forms of government in Indonesia and whether these policies 
have affected economic and human development in Indonesia differently.  
 This paper is organized as follows. In section III, drawing on different literature sources, 
I will discuss how to classify different regimes in Indonesia as authoritarian or democratic. Then 
I will review academic literature on how different types of governments affect economic and 
human development. In section IV, I examine the different policy approaches taken by different 
governments in Indonesia in pursuit of economic and human development. I assess whether there 
is any difference in the trend of development in both areas. In discussing economic development 
policies, I cover policies and outcomes related to inflation, foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment . Then, I compare the economic growth under two different periods. In discussing 
human development, I cover policies and outcomes related to income inequality, education and 
health. Then I compare the human development trend under two different periods. In section V, I 
draw conclusion.  
 
III. Literature Review 
Democracy and measurement of democracy 
 Democracy comes from two Greek words; demos (people) and kratos (rule). The simple 
definition of democracy is a form of government in which the people rule. In reality, however, 
this definition is too simple to use as a measurement to decide whether a particular regime is 
democratic or not. There are many other definitions and concepts of democracy, some narrow, 
some very comprehensive and some in the middle. Joseph Schumpeter(1976) suggested that 
8 
 
democracy is a system in which political leaders are chosen by people. People choose the leaders 
among the candidates who compete for their votes in the elections but between the elections, the 
political decisions are made by the politicians. This is rather a narrow concept of democracy. It 
focuses mainly on election as the basis of democracy and does not discuss people's participation 
in the broad political process. According to David Held (2006), democracy goes beyond the right 
to vote. It includes social and economic rights for people, equal opportunities for participation 
and for citizens' final control of the political agenda. David Held's concept is comprehensive and 
covers all the major aspects of social life, and popular rights in terms of political, civil, economic 
and social rights. However, these very narrow and very broad definitions of democracy are of 
little use in determining if a country is democratic or not (Sorenson, 2010).  
  For practical purposes, it is necessary to have some criteria that can be used to measure 
the degree of democracy in a particular country. In reality, countries lie on an authority spectrum 
with dictatorship and democracy on each end. The crude measure of telling whether a country is 
democracy or not will help little in studying the effect of regime type on the policy outcomes. 
The measure of the degree of democracy plays an important role in comparing two different 
regimes. For example, in comparing countries, the Freedom House uses one dimension for 
political rights and one dimension for civil liberties to measure the degree of democracy in a list 
of countries and ranked them according to the scores they achieved. Therefore, when comparing 
regimes, it is necessary to determine not only their regime type but also where they stand on the 
authority spectrum and the degree of democracy.  
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Classifying the regimes in two different period (1967-1998) and (1999-2010) 
 The first thing I tried to do in my research is to classify the two governments in the two 
different periods in Indonesia either as a democracy or as an authoritarian. According to 
Przeworski et al. (2000), democracy is a regime in which government offices are filled by 
contested elections, or democracy is a system in which parties lose elections. To classify the 
regimes in Indonesia, my paper adopted the method used by Przeworski et al.(2000) in their 
book, Democracy and Development. The rules that are used to classify whether a regime is 
democratic are 
 (1) the chief executive must be elected.  
 For a regime to be democratic, the chief executive must be elected by popular elections 
and must be responsible only directly to voters or to a legislature elected by them. Indirect 
elections qualify as popular only if the electors are themselves elected.  
(2) the legislature must be elected  
 Here "the legislature" can be a congress, an assembly or a parliament. Only the lower 
house is considered and a constituent assembly that does not have ordinary legislative powers is 
not considered a legislature. 
(3) there must be more than one party 
 Here "party" means an independent list of candidates represented to voters in elections. In 
order for a regime to be qualified as democratic, there must be an opposition party. If there is no 
party or only one party, the regime is considered authoritarian. 
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 Elections and the existence of opposition parties alone cannot prove that the regime is 
democratic. In some cases, elections are held because the incumbents know that the opposition 
cannot win. In other cases, the incumbents would not allow the opposition to assume office if it 
won in the election, or the ruling dictator himself forms another party as an opposition party to 
justify his regime as democratic but would never let that opposition party win the election. 
Therefore, holding elections and existence of opposition parties are necessary but not sufficient 
to classify a regime as democratic.  
That is why a fourth rule is necessary and that is- 
 (4) there must be an alternation of power. 
 According to Przeworski et al. (2000), if all the first three conditions are satisfied and if 
the incumbent subsequently held but never lost elections, such regime is considered 
authoritarian.  
 When we apply the four rules presented, Suharto's New Order regime doesn't pass the test 
of democratic government. Under the New Order regime, the President and the legislature were 
elected. Two opposition parties were allowed to exist but there were strict limitations to the 
movement of opposition parties9. Suharto's New Order regime satisfied the first three rules but 
throughout the period from 1966 to 1998, there was no alternation of power. Suharto ruled 
Indonesia for 32 years until he was forced out of presidency in 1998 after the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Therefore according to Przeworski et al. (2000), Suharto's New Order regime is classified 
as authoritarian although Suharto himself proclaimed his regime as democracy. B. J. Habibie 
who served as vice-president under Suharto and became president when Suharto resigned is 
                                                             
9 Opposition parties were prevented from operating at the local level other than during the three-week official 
campaign period prior to election.  
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regarded as transitional government because he held democratic elections and transferred power 
to the new government in 1999. The subsequent  governments after 1999 election are classified 
as democracy because they satisfied all the four conditions presented.  
 After determining the type of government in each of the two periods, I continue to look at 
the regime authority characteristics of each periods by using Polity score. According to Polity IV 
project, it is better to treat democracy as a variable rather than characterizing a political system 
as democratic. Polity IV project uses a 21 point scale from -10 to +10. The higher Polity score 
reflects the institutional procedures that represent the higher degree of democracy. The Polity 
score is achieved by combining two other scores, DEMOC and AUTOC in the Polity data. The 
operational indicators of democracy and autocracy are derived from codings of other variables10 
in the polity data. DEMOC uses a scale of 0 to 10 and higher score of DEMOC represents the 
higher degree of institutionalized democracy. AUTOC also uses a scale of 0 to 10 and higher 
score of AUTOC represents the higher degree of institutionalized autocracy. DEMOC and 
AUTOC scales do not share any categories in common but many polities have mixed authority 
traits and they can have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. Polity score 
is obtained by subtracting AUTOC score from DEMOC score.  
 According to data from Polity IV, Indonesia scored -6 in 1966 and -7 from 1967 to 1997 
showing Suharto's New Order regime as autocratic. When Suharto resigned and transferred 
power to B.J. Habibie's transitional government in 1998, the Polity score rose to -5. After 
democratic elections were held in 1999 and the new government took power, Indonesia's Polity 
score became 6 classifying Indonesia's political system as democratic. Although Indonesian 
                                                             
10 For the detailed explanation of the derivation of scores in Polity data, please refer to Polity IV user's manual 
which can be retrieved at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf  
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government became democratic after 1999 election, the 1945 constitution of Indonesia was still 
in place and it required the President to be elected indirectly by the People's Consultative 
Assembly(MPR). Under this system, the power brokers inside the MPR had high influence in the 
selection of president and this weakened the degree of democracy in Indonesia. In November 
2001, changes to the 1945 constitution were made including the provision for direct presidential 
elections. These changes in executive recruitment processes have strengthened the democratic 
process in Indonesia. Indonesia's first direct presidential election was held in 2004 and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono was elected as the President. The Polity score of Indonesia rose to 8 since 
2004. Therefore, even after the democratic transition in 1999, I found that the degrees of 
democracy in Indonesia are different before 2004 and after 2004.11  
 
Policy outcomes under different types of government 
 The academic literature contains arguments both for and against effects of regime type on 
economic growth. Some said that democracy induces more growth while some said democracy 
retards growth. Galenson (1959) argued that democratic governments divert resources from 
investment to consumption more than the authoritarian governments. Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975) said that democracy undermines investment. The reasoning behind these 
arguments is that democratic governments are under pressure from the public for immediate 
consumption especially in the poor countries. Since the democratic governments must appeal to 
the public in order to gain political support, they yield to the public demand by expanding 
consumption at the cost of investment and future growth. Another argument is that democratic 
                                                             
11 Please refer to appendix 2 for Indonesia's Polity Scores 
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regimes are generally less capable of making tough choices to make economic development than 
the authoritarian regimes. The central premise of this reasoning is that development requires 
change, and change affects some voters adversely. Therefore, democratic government which is 
dependent on electoral support in the next election will typically tend to avoid choices that 
impose hardship on significant number of voters. The authoritarian governments, however, do 
not need to worry about voters approval as much as the democratic regimes for the political 
survival at least in the short term (Brown and Hunter, 1999).  
 The selectorate model also tries to explain why democratic and authoritarian 
governments differ in the political behavior and the provision of public goods. According to the 
selectorate model, democratic governments and authoritarian governments have different 
winning coalitions, the number of supporters a leader needs to maintain power, and the 
selectorates, the size of the pool from which these supporters are drawn. Democratic systems 
tend to have large selectorate and large coalitions whereas the authoritarian governments 
typically have much smaller selectorate and winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 
2010). Generally, leaders provide both public and private goods but they limit the access to 
private goods to their winning coalitions. For the authoritarian regimes, it is relatively easier to 
make the choice of providing private goods to its small winning coalition than providing public 
goods to all the people. In the democratic system, the winning coalition size is large and so, it is 
very costly to provide private goods to all its members. As a result, the democracies tend 
increase the provision of public goods to all the people instead of the provision of private goods 
to the winning coalition. 
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 With respect to the economic development. there are theories on both sides as to whether 
democracy is inimical or conducive to development. Two of them are 
 (1) Conflict Theory 
 Development requires decisive policy choice and effective policy implementation; 
authoritarian regimes are more decisive and more effective in implementing policy.  
  Ethnic and sub-national conflicts interfere with economic development, and are most 
effectively suppressed by strong authoritarian government. 
 Authoritarian governments are more able to effectively defer consumption in favor of 
savings. Democratic regimes are under a political imperative to increase social welfare 
spending, which reduces the rate of accumulation.  
  Democracy undermines investment (Huntington and Dominguez 1975).  
 
(2) Compatibility theory  
 
  Progressive development requires policy choices that lead to a development pathway that 
produces a wide distribution of the benefits of growth; democratic regimes are more effective 
at producing wide distribution of benefits (because of the strong tendency of authoritarian 
regimes to structure economic activity towards “rent-seeking” activities, enrichment of the 
ruling circle, and widespread corruption).  
 democratic regimes are less prone to corruption and rent-seeking; they are less 
“predatory”.  
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 Just as the abovementioned theories oppose each other, there are a number of counter-
examples in both directions. There are also arguments that regime type doesn't matter for 
development and what is important is the "stability". In a study done by Przeworski and 
Limongi, 18 cross-country studies were examined and the conclusion is that those studies do 
not provide a clear basis for conclusion about the causal properties of democratic institutions 
with regard to development (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: p.60).  
 
IV.  Indonesia under two different periods; (1966-1998) and (1998-2010)  
(a) Economic development policies and policy outcomes 
 Indonesia is an interesting case in the study of regime type and economic development. It 
has been under authoritarian rule of Suharto for more than three decades and has had a very 
strong economic development record till the economy collapsed during the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997. After the political transition to democracy, a series of new democratic 
governments has made policy reforms to stabilize the economy again. In my paper, I will look at 
the policies adopted by each type of regime and the outcomes from those policies.  
 
1. Control of inflation 
 When Suharto took power from Sukarno in 1966, Indonesia was isolated from the world 
economy. Indonesia's economy was crumbling and annual inflation reached a peak of 1,195 
percent in 1966. To rebuild the deteriorating economy, Suharto's New Order regime first tried to 
restore the trust of international investors by controlling inflation. He introduced the stabilization 
program with the help of IMF and held down the inflation rates. Suharto appointed a group of 
U.S.-educated Indonesian economists as his economic advisors and that group helped to bring 
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back Indonesia from dire economic conditions. The inflation rate dropped to 14 percent in 1970 
and 3 percent in 1971 (World Bank). However, in 1972, the failure of rice crop, high world rice 
price and rising commodity prices caused the inflation rate to go up again. In 1974, the inflation 
rate reached 46 percent but the economic management team successfully brought the inflation 
down to 11 percent in 1975. By 1978, the decrease in foreign reserves made the local currency 
devalue by 33 percent and the inflation rate rose to 34 percent in 1979 and 31 percent in 1980. 
After 1980, the inflation rate has been kept at or below 15 percent till there was the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 when the government injected liquidity into the banking system . These 
injections were on a massive scale, at the time equivalent to more than half of GDP, and they 
explain the sudden increase in both domestic public debt and inflation in 1998 (Hill and 
Shiraishi, 2007). 12 
 The problem with economic policymaking in Indonesia under Suharto's New Order 
regime was that there was tension between influential groups13 whose ideologies were different.. 
The technocrats, the group that was formally in charge of the economy, favored market reforms 
and a limited role for the government in the economy but the other group, called economic 
nationalists argued that trade protection and direct government investment and regulation were 
necessary to contain foreign influence while mobilizing sufficient resources to modernize the 
country. Suharto who was the final decision maker in policymaking turned to technocrats when 
the economy was weak and chaotic but stood on the side of nationalists when the economy 
                                                             
12 The historical trend of the inflation rate can be seen in figure 1 and appendix 1.  
13 Although both technocrats and economic nationalists were influential in shaping the economic policies of 
Indonesia, the latter had a stronger political base. Suharto himself was more ideologically inclined towards the 
economic nationalists and the Indonesian military which also had some influence in policy-making tended to ally 
with economic nationalists.  
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became strong again. Therefore, the economic policies were not consistent and the period of 
liberalization and the period of regulation alternated during Suharto's New Order regime.   
 In Indonesia, there is a strong Inflation aversion, which is the result of the nation's past 
experience. Economic stagnation at the end of Sukarno's Old Order regime was coupled with 
hyperinflation, and the Asian financial crisis which brought Indonesia's economy to its knees 
also created high inflation rate and brought hardships to Indonesians. Therefore, Indonesia 
government's first priority in stabilizing economy is to keep inflation under control. After the 
Asian financial crisis, Indonesia worked with IMF to restabilize the economy. It was not a 
problem for Indonesia to comply with IMF's Letter of Intent(LOI) to control inflation. In May 
1999, the new democratic government enacted a new central bank law that made the Bank of 
Indonesia(BI) independent. Under the new law, BI has full authority to decide upon the inflation 
target and freedom to choose instruments to achieve this target (Chowdhury, Siregar, 2004). BI 
has shifted towards a regime of inflation targeting and a managed float. Indonesia after the crisis 
resembles that of the Suharto era: prices rarely get out of control, but it is a relatively high 
inflation economy (Hill and Shiraishi, 2007).  
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figure 1. Inflation Rate, GDP Deflator ( Annual %), Indonesia 
 
*The shaded area shows the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank   
 
2. Foreign Trade 
 
 Soon after Suharto came to power, he rebuilt Indonesia's economy with the help of the 
well-known Berkeley Mafia,14 a group of U.S-educated Indonesian economists, and the period of 
liberalization began. Indonesian government first tried to reduce the control on foreign trade and 
remove the multiple exchange rate. In 1970, Indonesia has achieved complete unification of 
exchange rates by removing the remaining exchange controls on both capital accounts and 
current account transactions. In 1973, tariff schedule was revised and the tariff dispersion rate15 
                                                             
14 Berkeley Mafia is a team of economists from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia, whom 
Suharto appointed as his economic advisors. Three of the five academics were Berkeley PhDs and therefore, they 
were known as "Berkeley Mafia" or "technocrats". They were broadly in favor of markets and foreign capital. 
(Temple, 2001) 
15 Tariff dispersion rate measures how widely spread out are the tariffs in a schedule. A high tariff dispersion 
indicates that there are a lot of variation in the tariff schedule. Economists generally believe that a uniform tariff 
(with low dispersion) is more economically efficient.  
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was reduced (Fane, 1999). Both exports and imports increased in a short time. The liberalization 
period, however, was short-lived. Shortly after the liberalization period, there was a nationalist 
resurgence. Being an net exporter of oil, Indonesia benefited greatly from the two oil shocks of 
1970s. These huge gains from oil shocks allowed the Indonesian government to reduce 
dependence on foreign investment in many sectors of the economy. The strong economy also 
enabled economic nationalists to persuade President Suharto to practice protectionism.    
 Suharto's government liberalized the economy in the beginning but in response to 
concerns over foreign economic dominance, in the late 1970s, the government set up trade 
barriers to protect the new state-owned enterprises and also those owned by private domestic and 
foreign joint venture investors. It employed both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The government 
also started the heavy industrialization and protected it by using non-tariff barriers.  In 1976, the 
government began the "deletion program for commercial vehicles" which is essentially to 
substitute some components of vehicles with locally made components. In 1983, the deletion list 
was extended and in 1985, import of new and second-hand ships were banned to protect the 
government-owned shipbuilding industry (Nasution, 1985, p. 13). Licenses were used to restrict 
imports and for some imports such as petroleum products, explosives and steel products were 
allowed only to state-owned firms. Some private companies owned by cronies were also granted 
monopolies. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Indonesia mostly practiced protectionist 
policies. These protectionist policies benefited the state-owned firms and cronies who were 
holding monopolies but they raised the input cost for down-stream producers who used the 
imported materials in their production process. These high costs were then passed to domestic 
consumers and also contributed to the low competitiveness of export-oriented 
industries(Kuncoro et al., 2006).  
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 In the early 1980s, the economic growth rate declined16 and it indicated the limits in the 
industrialization strategy under protectionist policies. In 1986, oil price collapsed and the 
revenue from oil export declined. The technocrats took this opportunity to persuade President 
Suharto to make a series of major trade reforms. They developed a strategic reform program and, 
partly with the assistance of low-profile foreign advisors, persuaded the president that, in view of 
the falling international oil prices, the country would face a scenario of debt crisis and IMF 
intervention if the liberalizations were not affected (Bird et al. 2008). Suharto was convinced and 
once again a period of liberalization began. Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers were reduced. As 
a result, the real effective rate of protection for manufacturing(excluding the special case of oil 
and gas processing)17 declined from 59 percent to 16 percent over the period of 1987-1995(Fane 
and Condon, 1996). The period of liberalization policies and the period of protectionist policies 
under Suharto's regime is reflected in the historical trend of imports and exports illustrated in 
figure 2 and 3. Economic policymaking in Suharto era displayed the power struggle between the 
liberal-minded technocrats and the nationalist officers, and the policy trend had been inconsistent 
throughout the period.  
 
 
 
                                                             
16 GDP growth rate declined from 8 percent in 1981 to 1 percent in 1982. Growth rate increased to 8 percent in 
1983 and 7 percent in 1984 but in 1985, the growth rate again declined to 3 percent (World Bank). For annual GDP 
per capita and GDP per capita growth rate, please refer to figure 6 and 7.  
17 The real effective rate of protection(RERP) of a sector is defined as the proportionate increase in its real value 
added per unit due to the complete system of trade policies, where real value added is obtained by deflating 
nominal value by the nominal wages. In calculating the change in RERP for Indonesia between 1987 and 1995, Fane 
and Condon(1996) considered 3 sources of reductions in measured RERP which are (1) new forestry nominal rate 
of protections (2) new production weights & export sector reclassification, and (3) trade reforms. The RERP for 
1995 was obtained by subtracting the sum of the contributions of these three sources from RERP for 1987.  
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figure 2. Import of Goods and Services, (2000 US$) (1966-2010), Indonesia 
 
*The shaded area shows the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
 
figure 3. Export of Goods and Services (2000 US$) (1966-2010), Indonesia 
 
*The shaded area shows the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
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 Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the framework for making economic policy has 
changed significantly. Previously the reformers needed only to wait for the window of 
opportunity and convince Suharto to make reforms. Under the new democratic government, they 
have to win over a constituency, in the parliament, the press and civil society, in generally 
unfavorable ideological circumstances18 (Bird et al. 2008). After the economic crisis of 1997, 
Indonesian government signed a number of Letters of Intent(LOIs) with the IMF and there were 
trade related provisions in them. The provisions include the removal of special privileges and 
monopolies granted to family members and close circles of Suharto.  
 Indonesia graduated from IMF structural adjustment program in 2004 but the government 
proceeded with trade liberalization and made a commitment to reduce the tariffs to around 5% by 
2010. Although tariffs were reduced, the number of non-tariff barriers increased in the form of 
import license requirements.  Basri and Soesastro (2005) called this behavior Indonesia's 
"creeping protectionism". These import licenses were controlled by the ministry regulating a 
particular industry and authorized by the Ministry of Trade (MOT). The Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) controlled tariffs but the other ministries introduced specific non-tariff barriers and the 
trade policy became inconsistent after 2001.  
  In 2001, P T Bogasri, the dominant local flour producer, requested MOT to impose 20% 
tariff on imports, on the ground that the imports were damaging the industry and could 
potentially cause job losses. MOT decided in favor of P T Bogasari and signed an approval letter 
to raise the tariff to 20% but MOF disagreed with MOT's decision and refused to implement it. 
                                                             
18 Regarding the unfavorable ideological circumstances for reformers, Bird et al.(2008) explained that after the fall 
of Suharto, the parliament has been transformed into a powerful but unpredictable political force. They also said 
that proliferation of political parties, weak party discipline, the absence of coherent ideologies and policy 
platforms, and low level of economic literacy have resulted into a strong inclination towards populist politics, 
reflecting a general community reluctance to embrace liberal economic policies of reformers. 
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Finally, an agreement was reached at 6% tariff but MOT was not satisfied with the result and set 
up NTBs on import of flour on its own. Therefore, with the decentralization power under the 
democratic government and with different ideologies between different ministries, the trade 
policy became inconsistent. There is a strong nationalist  sentiment but in general, there has been 
no significant retreat into protectionism and Indonesia has remained relatively open to 
international trade.  
 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key pillar of sustainable economic growth and offers 
non-financial benefits, most notably positive spillovers such as productivity gains and knowledge 
transfers. Aware of this, Indonesia seeks not only more but also better FDI, the kind that reduces 
unemployment, social inequality and poverty (BKPM, 2010). After implementing plans to regain 
the trust of international investors by introducing stabilization programs with the help of IMF in 
the late 1960s, Suharto's government tried to promote foreign direct investment. In the beginning 
of Suharto's rule, the government, according to the strategies of technocrats, liberalized the 
economy and made a number of reforms to provide favorable conditions to foreign investors. 
 The very first step they took is to pass investment laws. The Indonesian government 
introduced the Foreign Direct Investment Law, No. 1 in 1967. This law allows foreign investors 
the right to repatriate both profits and the proceeds raised by selling their initial investments and 
accumulated retained earnings. The foreign investment regulations also provided for accelerated 
depreciation allowances, and income tax holidays of two years or longer for approved projects. 
Similar tax incentives were applied to domestic investments under the Domestic Investment 
Law, No. 6. These reforms attracted a huge inflow of foreign investments. After reaping huge 
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windfall gains from two oil shocks of 1970s, the Indonesian government had an increased ability 
to finance investment without borrowing abroad. Also, in response to the popular sentiment, the 
Indonesian government reduced the tax incentives for new investments, prohibited foreign 
investment in some sectors in which it had formerly been allowed, and required all new foreign 
investment to be channeled through joint ventures involving local partners (Hill, 1988, pp 29-
31).  As a result of these strengthened regulations, FDI became stagnant until the mid-1980s. 
  In 1986, there was a sharp fall in oil prices and it affected the Indonesian economy which 
is a net oil exporter. In response to declining economic conditions, Indonesian government made 
structural adjustment since mid-1980s. To maintain the high rate of investment, the Indonesian 
government responded by relaxing restrictions it had imposed on foreign investment in the past. 
A succession of reform packages were passed during 1986-94 and Indonesia opened up sectors 
which were previously closed to foreign investors and relaxed the equity constraints on the 
maximum share of foreign partners in joint ventures. Most of the incentives the packages 
provided were in the form of reduced regulations rather than tax exemption. 
  During the same period, international investment conditions were changing in favor of 
Indonesia. There were huge waves of FDI from Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan mainly to 
Thailand and Malaysia. These floods of FDI raised the labor cost and there were shortage of 
infrastructure especially in Thailand. These conditions improved the relative attractiveness of 
Indonesia to foreign investors. The deregulations polices and emergence of favorable 
international conditions increased the flow of FDI into Indonesia (Osada, 1994). A period of FDI 
growth was seen in Indonesia until the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
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figure 4. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
 
 
*The shaded area shows the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
* FDI data for Indonesia before 1981 is not available 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
 After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, there was a period of capital flight from 
Indonesia. Foreign investors lost their confidence in the Indonesia's economy. The amount of 
capital in approved FDI projects decreased by 64 percent between 1997 and 1998 (BPS 1999, p. 
459). There was negative figure of FDI from 1998 to 2001 and in 2003. A lack of confidence of 
international investors and declining investments contributed to the fall of oil production19, the 
country's once strong pillar of economy, while the domestic oil consumption had been rising. As 
                                                             
19 The aging of oil fields in Indonesia slowed down the production. In response,  Indonesia tried to increase 
exploration and modernization of existing oil fields but the political instability, rising nationalism that brought 
hostility toward foreign companies, and an unsupportive legal framework made it difficult to convince foreign 
investors to invest in Indonesia's oil resources (Pallone, 2009).  
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a result, Indonesia became net oil importer in 2004 and it formally suspended OPEC membership 
in 2008. 20 
figure 5. Total Oil Production, Indonesia (1980-2009) 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 Indonesia's experience of both the economic crisis and the collapse of political system 
made it difficult for its economy to recover in a short time. While other Asian countries  were 
solving their economic problems after the crisis of 1997, Indonesia had to overcome challenges 
both in the economic and political arenas. The transition period from Suharto's authoritarian rule 
to democratic rule has not been easy and there were many uncertainties as to whether the new 
democratic government would be able to attain stability. Within six-year period after Suharto's 
resignation in 1998, Indonesia has seen four presidents. The short time span each president 
                                                             
20 Indonesia requested the suspension of its OPEC membership in 2008 at the 149th meeting of the OPEC 
conference and it was accepted. The membership suspension was effective in  January 2009.  
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stayed in office made it difficult for them to enact significant reforms except going along with 
IMF programs from 1998 to 2004. 
 The high level of corruption in Indonesia has also been a serious problem in the 
development context. Cross-national statistical analyses largely confirm that corruption lowers 
investment and therefore economic growth (Mauro, 1995). Corruption has been a chronic 
problem in Indonesia and the corruption perception index(CPI)21 for Indonesia has been low 
showing high level of corruption. 22 Since the beginning of his New Order regime, Suharto 
declared to fight corruption. However, during his 32-year presidency, the corruption has been 
rampant and his family and associates accumulated billions of dollars in assets from public 
sector. In 1998, Transparency International ranked Indonesia as number eighty out of eighty-five 
countries in their survey. Suharto's era has had strong economic growth rate although there was 
also high level of corruption.  
 After the transition to democracy, each successive president has vowed to fight 
corruption but the problem remains grave. Anti-corruption programs were launched but without 
significant success. The data in the table.1 from Transparency International shows that there has 
been very slow improvement if there is at all. It can be seen that in 1997 during Suharto's 
presidency, the corruption perception index(CPI) for Indonesia was 2.72 and in 2010, more than 
a decade after transition to democracy, CPI was still at 2.8 ranking Indonesia at 110 out of 178 
countries surveyed.  
 
                                                             
21 Transparency International used corruption perception index (CPI) to rank countries according to their level of 
corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).  
22 Please refer to table 1. for Indonesia's corruption perception index from 1995 to 2010. 
 
28 
 
 
Source: Transparency International  
 In fact, to achieve economic development, the corruption is more of a problem for the 
new democratic government than for the New Order regime of Suharto because the political base 
of governments is different. The apparent better economic performance of Indonesia in the past, 
despite the problem of corruption, might be attributed to the fact that Indonesian corruption or 
rent-seeking activities were centralized, and thus were more predictable. With the departure of 
Suharto, this system has been replaced by a more fragmented system, with at least five dominant 
parties competing for power and financial resources. The transaction costs caused by corruption, 
or even in generally conducting business, are now much less predictable (Kuncoro.A et al, 2006).  
 In Indonesia, the political instability, slow economic reforms and high level of corruption 
slowed the economic recovery. This climate of uncertainty greatly reduced the incentive for 
investors to do business in Indonesia. Only after 2004, Indonesia began to see the positive net 
inflow of FDI again and in 2010 it has reached to the highest level of more than US$ 13 billion.  
 
 
Table 1. Corruption Perception Index 
(Indonesia,1995-2010) 
                
Year                  CPI   
                  
Year               CPI 
1995 1.94   2003 1.9 
1996 2.65   2004 2 
1997 2.72   2005 2.2 
1998 2   2006 2.4 
1999 1.7   2007 2.3 
2000 1.7   2008 2.6 
2001 1.9   2009 2.8 
2002 1.9   2010 2.8 
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4. GDP Growth 
 In comparing economic growth of the two period under different types of government, it 
can be seen that the general trend is not much different. GDP has been growing throughout the 
period of study and has had a positive growth rate except in 1998 just after the Asian Financial 
crisis. The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita from 1968-1997 is 5.18 percent and 
from 1999-2010 is 3.58 percent. Therefore, during the period of study, the average growth rate is 
lower under the democratic government.  
figure 6. GDP per capita, Indonesia (constant 2000 US$), 1966-2010 
*The shaded area represents the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
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figure 7. GDP per capita growth , Indonesia (annual %), 1966-2010 
 
*The shaded area represents the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
 
(b) Human development policies and the policy outcomes 
 Many studies said that democracies do a better job than non-democracies of improving 
the welfare of the poor (Przeworski et al. 2000). Some political economy models also suggest 
that democracies produce more public goods, and more income redistribution, than non-
democracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). However, the question is whether 
democracies always spend more on social welfare than dictatorships and when they spend more, 
whether the higher social spending benefits the poor. There are competing arguments from both 
sides. Brown and Hunter(1999) said that authoritarian regimes display greater sensitivity than 
their democratic counterparts to economic constraints in social spending. They explained, using 
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their results from the investigation of the effect of regime type on social spending in 17 Latin 
American countries, that when facing low levels of per-capita income and negative rates of 
growth, authoritarian governments reduce social spending at a faster rate than democracies. 
When the economy becomes strong again, the authoritarian governments increase social 
spending at a faster rate.  By contrast, democracies show greater sensitivity to political 
constraints. There are reasonable explanations for such behaviors. The authoritarian rulers do not 
need to be concerned with reelection prospect and short-term popularity. Therefore, when facing 
with economic constraints, they are ready to cut back on social spending. On the other side, the 
politicians in democratic regimes worry more about reelection and hope to garner votes and 
approval from the public by providing public goods. However, it doesn't imply that democracies 
always have higher social spending than authoritarian regimes. Brown and Hunter (1999) said 
that as economic development reaches higher and higher levels, authoritarian regimes begin to 
overtake democracies in social spending. They presented the Brazilian military regime (1964-85) 
as an example in which the government directed massive funds towards university education in 
an effort to buy the students' political quiescence instead of using repressive strategy. The 
reasoning behind is that the authoritarian leaders try to make up for their lack of legitimacy with 
the support they hope to gain from higher social spending when they can afford it. Stallings and 
Kaufman (1982, 220) claimed that " regime type weighs more heavily in condition of crisis." 
Brown and Hunter (1999) said that "our investigation of 17 Latin American countries from 1980 
to 1992 suggests that democratic regimes are associated with higher rates of social expenditures 
when faced with important economic constraints." Therefore, under the condition of stable 
economy, it is not at all clear which type of government will have higher social spending. When 
there is higher social spending in one type of government, what is also interesting to see is how 
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the increased social spending is distributed. Some findings suggest that democracies spend more 
money on education and health than non-democracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to 
middle-and upper-income groups (Ross, 2006).   
1. Income Inequality 
 To see if there is different inequality of income distribution under authoritarian 
government and democracy government in Indonesia, I looked at the GINI Index23 of income for 
Indonesia. In figure 8 and appendix 3, we can see the GINI Index of income for Indonesia. Due 
to the limitations on the availability of data, GINI Index for Indonesia is available only for the 
1984-2005 interval, estimated every three years. Of these, it covers 13 years in Suharto's regime 
with 5 indices and 7 years in democratic regime with 3 indices. Therefore, although it is not 
complete for the entire period of my study, we can get a glimpse of the trend of income 
inequality in Indonesia from these data. From these data, we can see that the income inequality 
remained stable from 1984 to 2002 with fluctuations of only one or two index points but GINI 
Index reached the highest in 2005 at 34 under the democratic government. It is premature to 
conclude from these very small data that there is more income inequality under democratic 
government but we can tell that the income inequality is not declining seven years after the 
introduction of democracy.  
 
 
 
                                                             
23 GINI index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The GINI index of 0 represents perfect equality while an 
index of 100 implies perfect inequality. (World Bank) 
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Figure. 8  GINI Index of Income, Indonesia (1984-2005) 
 
*The shaded area represents the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
2. Educational Attainment 
 The Indonesian constitution of 1945 states that every citizen has the right to an education. 
Education has been given high priority by Indonesian governments. Education has been used as 
an instrument of cultural and linguistic integration, political socialization, and economic 
development (Liddle, 1985). During Suharto's New Order regime, there were big changes in the 
education sector especially in the 1970s. After receiving windfall gains from rising oil prices in 
1970s, Suharto's government greatly expanded public education. In 1973, a major school 
reconstruction program was launched and between 1973-74 and 1978-79, more than 61,000 
school buildings were built (Duflo, 2000). School enrollments also rose during the period. 
Indonesia's educational reform during that period has been cited as "one of the most successful 
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cases of large-scale school expansion on record" (World Bank (1990a)). Although there was 
dramatic increase in the amount of spending especially on the building of schools and increased 
enrollment, those reforms did not translate well into improvement in quality of educational 
outcome. There were high dropout rates. In 1970, 68.9 percent of age group 15-19 enrolled in 
primary education and 33.9 percent finished it. In 1975, 69.9 percent of age group 15-19 enrolled 
in primary education and 36.6  percent finished it(Barro-Lee, 2010). According to UNESCO, the 
public expenditure on education as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) declined after 
1972 and remained below 2 percent till the end of Suharto's regime.  
 
Figure 9. Public Expenditure on Education as % of GNI 
 
*The shaded area represents the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: UNESCO 
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Figure 10. School enrollment as a percentage of population (age 15-19) 
 
Data Source: barrolee.com 
 After the transition to democracy in Indonesia, public spending on education greatly 
increased and in 2010, it reached 4.7 percent of GNI. Although educational spending rose, there 
were problems to attain high quality educational achievement due to changes in political 
structure. After the fall of Suharto, there were strong demands for more regional independence 
and as a consequence, in 2001, two laws of regional independence were implemented. Districts 
obtained more discretion over public revenues and expenditures in their respective regions. 
Under Suharto's government, Indonesia was highly centralized and more than 90 percent of 
public revenue and expenditure going through the central authorities in Jakarta. With the 
decentralization law enacted by the new democratic government, the central government 
transferred more than 30 percent of domestic revenues back to the provinces in 2001 but the 
district were fully responsible for the provision of public services to the citizens including the 
educational services. This was not a big problem for rich districts with high level of domestic 
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revenue but it posed a great challenge for poor districts to maintain the educational standards. 
The enrollment rate for the group of age 15 to 19 has been rising but we can see in figure.10 that 
the majority of that age group enrolled in primary education. Therefore, the average year of 
schooling for that age group is also low.  
 The existing educational institutions were also not enough to meet the rising demand for 
higher education in Indonesia. Therefore, many private institutes have been established to meet 
the demand, but the monitoring on their activities is minimal and it resulted in widespread 
quality problems(Sjöholm, 2002). According to the data from Barro and Lee(2010), Indonesia's 
educational attainment has been improving over the period from Suharto's New Order regime to 
the current democratic government but when we look at the average years of schooling for the 
group of age 15 to 19, the achievement was low compared to the other lower-middle-income 
countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Viet Nam.  
 
3. Health (Infant mortality rate) 
 The measure commonly used in seeing if the social spending brings better outcome for 
the poor is the infant mortality rate. If the benefits of the social programs reach the poor, they 
should produce better social results such as longer, healthier, or more productive lives. The 
Indonesia's transition to democracy in 1998 provides me with an opportunity to see if there is 
difference in infant mortality rate between Suharto's authoritarian regime and the new democratic 
regime. Data show that in Indonesia, the infant mortality has been declining consistently since 
the beginning of Suharto's New Order regime. There is no significant change in the rate of 
decline of infant mortality until the end of the period I observed which is 2010. There are 
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possible explanations for the observed pattern. One is that Suharto's authoritarian regime 
implemented programs that effectively improve the well-being of the poor. The other is that 
there is no significant changes in social policies and social spending that will have significant 
improvement for the poor so that there will be observable significant changes in the rate of 
decline of infant mortality.  
 
figure 11. Mortality Rate, Infant ( per 1,000 live births) 
 
 
*The shaded area represents the democratic transition peroid in Indonesia (May 1998 to October 1999) 
Source: World Bank 
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 Indonesia has been making progress in human development along the way from Suharto's 
era to the current democratic government albeit very slowly. The improvements can be seen in 
the following table of human development index (HDI) from UNDP.  
 Human development index a composite index attained by combining indicators of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income. The creation of the HDI was a breakthrough 
because it was the first single statistic which was to serve as a frame of reference for both social 
and economic development. HDI is presented as a value between 0 and 1 (UNDP). According to 
the trend in HDI, it can be said that economic and social conditions are improving in Indonesia 
since 1980. The problem, however, is that it is improving at a rate slower than the average rate of 
the medium human development group it is in. Indonesia is ranked 124 out of 187 countries in 
the list. Since 1980, Indonesia has been in the medium human development group and it can be 
seen from the table that from 1980 to 1995, Indonesia's HDI score is higher than the average 
score of the group it was in but starting from 2000, Indonesia has been falling behind in the 
group. Also in the East Asia and the Pacific group, Indonesia has been falling behind. In figure 3, 
it can be seen that the HDI trend of Indonesia and HDI trend of East Asia and the Pacific group 
is diverging.  
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Table 2. ( Human Development Index) 
Human Development Index         
Year Indonesia Medium human 
development 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
World 
1980 0.423   0.420   0.428   0.558   
1985 0.460   0.450   0.463   0.576   
1990 0.481   0.480   0.498   0.594   
1995 0.527   0.517   0.544   0.613   
2000 0.543   0.548   0.581   0.634   
2005 0.572   0.587   0.622   0.660   
2006 0.579   0.595   0.631   0.664   
2007 0.591   0.605   0.642   0.670   
2008 0.598   0.612   0.651   0.674   
2009 0.607   0.618   0.658   0.676   
2010 0.613   0.625   0.666   0.679   
 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Indicators, Indonesia 
 
Figure 12.  Human Development Index: Trends 1980-present 
 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Indicators for Indonesia, 2011  
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V. Conclusion 
 In general, the economic development and human development trend in Indonesia before 
and after democratization are not very different. Both periods have relatively high inflation 
economy. International trade is growing and trade remains open although there has been strong 
nationalist sentiment. Positive GDP growth rate has been maintained throughout the period of 
study except in 1998 when the economy collapsed due to Asian financial crisis. GDP growth rate 
is found to be relatively lower after democratization than before democratization. Corruption 
level is high both before and after the democratization. In human development, the income 
inequality indicated by GINI index is almost the same from 1984 to 2002 and in 2005 the income 
inequality has increased. The educational attainment has been improving albeit at a relatively 
slower rate than the other lower-middle income countries. The most consistent improvement 
throughout the period of study from 1966 to 2010 is the decline in the infant mortality rate and 
there is no obvious change in the declining rate before and after democratization in Indonesia. 
According to the trend in HDI, Indonesia is making consistent improvement.  
 The fact that policy outcomes in Indonesia before and after the democratization are 
mostly unchanged comes as no surprise because the policies adopted by the regimes before and 
after the democratization were also not very different. Suharto's regime was authoritarian but he 
was pragmatic in making economic policies. Suharto tried to make up for his lack of legitimacy 
as a dictator by building strong state with strong economy. Although Suharto leaned more on the 
side of economic nationalist since they represented his winning coalition, he was also open to 
ideas from the technocrats and adopted liberal reforms. Therefore, strong growth was achieved 
under the authoritarian government in Indonesia. Even after the democratic transition, economic 
policies in Indonesia remains mostly unchanged except for the removal of monopolies in some 
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areas and structural reforms that took place under IMF program. The nationalist sentiment is still 
strong in Indonesia and the government practiced protectionist policies in some areas although 
the market remains open.  
 Another chronic problem in Indonesia that still persist after democratization is the 
widespread corruption. Suharto's New Order regime was notorious for its corruption and political 
patronage but successfully built a strong economy with high growth rate. The new democratic 
government has faced with same corruption problems but has slower growth rate. There is a 
possibility that the corruption problem has been made worse by the decentralization. Kuncoro.A 
et al, (2006) argued that the transaction cost generated by corruption is more unpredictable under 
decentralized system than under a single bribe-setting monopolist and thereby reduces the 
incentive for investment which will lead to growth. The compatibility theory also argues that 
democracy brings better economic growth because democratic regimes are less prone to 
corruption and rent-seeking. In the case of Indonesia, however, the democratic governments have 
not yet been successful in fighting corruption that it has inherited from the previous regime and it 
might be one of the reasons why the economic growth trend is not much different after 
democratization. The GDP per capita has been growing in Indonesia but the faster growth rate 
under the dictatorship and relatively slower growth under the democratic government might also 
be attributed to the catch-up effect which explains that it is easier for an economy to grow from 
very low level than to maintain the same growth rate after it has achieved a middle-income base.  
 Although the political system has changed, the democracy in Indonesia is still very young 
and there was political instability which greatly hampered the economic growth. Indonesian case 
seems to supports the claim that "regime type doesn't matter for development... what is important 
is stability". After democratization, the political structure has changed and the president has 
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relatively weaker authority in setting policies. The parliament becomes politically stronger but 
there is no single party holding the majority of seats in the parliament. This situation brings 
difficulty in adopting consistent development policies.  
  In human development context, the decentralization law after democratization seems to 
have brought hardships to some poor districts in providing public services. The decentralization 
has also been promoted by the World Bank based on the idea that this would make public 
services more responsive to citizen preference. In the case of Indonesia, however, I found that 
decentralization brought serious problems to areas with low capacity to implement development 
policies.  
 I am hopeful that with the emergence of strong civil society institutions which were 
previously suppressed, better conditions for more media freedom and more vocal citizens, there 
will be better policy outcomes to the extent the voters can hold the officials more and more 
accountable. It would be unreasonable to expect that transition to democracy would bring better 
policy outcomes overnight. Gerring et al. (2012) argues that a country's contemporary level of 
democracy has only a weak association with improved human development while a country's 
historical experience with democracy has a strong and robust influence on human development. 
Although the democratic transition occurred in 1998, it will take time for Indonesia's democracy 
to mature and bear fruit. Therefore, it seems things are improving in Indonesia but to see the 
significantly better policy outcomes than the previous regime, Indonesia needs to speed up the 
democracy consolidation process and strengthen its democracy.  
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VII. Appendixes 
 
Appendix. 1. Historical Inflation Rate in Indonesia 
Country  Indonesia 
  Year Inflation , GDP deflator (annual %) Year Inflation , GDP deflator (annual %) 
1967 165 1989 10 
1968 121 1990 8 
1969 21 1991 9 
1970 14 1992 5 
1971 3 1993 9 
1972 15 1994 8 
1973 35 1995 10 
1974 46 1996 9 
1975 11 1997 13 
1976 15 1998 75 
1977 13 1999 14 
1978 9 2000 20 
1979 34 2001 14 
1980 31 2002 6 
1981 10 2003 5 
1982 6 2004 9 
1983 14 2005 14 
1984 8 2006 14 
1985 4 2007 11 
1986 0 2008 18 
1987 15 2009 8 
1988 13 2010 8 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Appendix 2. Polity Score (Indonesia)  
country year flag fragment democ autoc polity 
Indonesia 1966 0   0 6 -6 
Indonesia 1967 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1968 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1969 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1970 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1971 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1972 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1973 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1974 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1975 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1976 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1977 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1978 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1979 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1980 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1981 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1982 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1983 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1984 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1985 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1986 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1987 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1988 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1989 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1990 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1991 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1992 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1993 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1994 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1995 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1996 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1997 0   0 7 -7 
Indonesia 1998 0   0 5 -5 
Indonesia 1999 0   7 1 6 
Indonesia 2000 0 0 7 1 6 
Indonesia 2001 0 0 7 1 6 
Indonesia 2002 0 0 7 1 6 
Indonesia 2003 0 0 7 1 6 
Indonesia 2004 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2005 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2006 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2007 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2008 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2009 0 0 8 0 8 
Indonesia 2010 0 0 8 0 8 
 Source: Polity IV Project 
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Appendix.3  GINI Index ( Indonesia) 
 
  Year Index 
1984 30.5 
1985 - 
1986 - 
1987 29.3 
1988 - 
1989 - 
1990 29.2 
1991 - 
1992 - 
1993 29.3 
1994 - 
1995 - 
1996 31.3 
1997 - 
1998 - 
1999 29 
2000 - 
2001 - 
2002 29.7 
2003 - 
2004 - 
2005 34 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Appendix. 4  Public Expenditure on Education as % of GNI 
    Year Public Expenditure on Education as % of GNI 
      
  1972 2.6 
  - - 
  1989 0.9 
  - - 
  1994 1 
  1995 1 
  1996 1.1 
  1997 1.1 
  - - 
  2001 2.8* 
  2002 3.0* 
  2003 3.3* 
  2004 2.9* 
  2005 3.0* 
  2006 3.8* 
  2007 3.7 
  2008 2.9 
  2009 - 
  2010 4.7 
  * represents UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) estimation  
Source: UNESCO 
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